Visual Reference and Iconic Content by Echeverri, Santiago
Visual Reference and Iconic ContentSantiago Echeverri*y
Evidence from cognitive science supports the claim that humans and other animals see
the world as divided into objects. Although this claim is widely accepted, it remains un-
clear whether the mechanisms of visual reference have representational content or are
directly instantiated in the functional architecture. I put forward a version of the former
approach that construes object ﬁles as icons for objects. This view is consistent with the
evidence that motivates the architectural account, can respond to the key arguments
against representational accounts, and has explanatory advantages. I draw general les-
sons for the philosophy of perception and the naturalization of intentionality.
In the last several decades, an impressive number of ﬁndings have accumu-
lated to the effect that humans and other animals perceive the world as di-
vided into objects. The evidence comes from different research traditions:
developmental studies on object cognition in human infants, studies on non-
human animals, and experiments on visual segmentation and tracking in hu-
man adults. Although there is no demonstrative argument to the effect that
these researchers have been studying the same mechanisms, there are rea-
sonable grounds to think so: this hypothesis has allowed each research com-
munity to design new experiments and offer novel solutions to account for
apparently puzzling results (Leslie et al. 1998; Tremoulet et al. 2000; Carey
and Xu 2001; Pylyshyn 2003, 2007; Scholl 2007; Carey 2009).
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All uetrable mechanisms. Nevertheless, there is a lively debate concerning the
nature of those mechanisms. Whereas developmental psychologists charac-
terize object segmentation and tracking as representational (Spelke 1988,
1994; Carey 2009), it has been argued that object perception is directly im-
plemented in the functional architecture (Pylyshyn 2003, 2007). On the ar-
chitectural view, visual reference is ‘direct’ because it is a purely causal process
devoid of representational content. Hereafter, I refer to the two approaches as
the representational (RA) and the architectural (AA) accounts respectively.1
This article defends a version of RA. The view I recommend holds that
object representations have iconic content. I dub this the iconic-content ac-
count (ICA). According to Fodor (2008, 173), a content is iconic if and only
if it satisﬁes the Parts Principle: if P is a picture of X, then parts of P are pic-
tures of parts of X. The suggestion is that object representations satisfy this
principle. They are icons that represent parts of objects arranged in some
speciﬁc ways.
I doubt that one could provide a demonstrative argument to the effect that
visual reference has representational content. I do think, however, that one
can compare the strengths and weaknesses of representational and anti-
representational views and then decide which view is best overall. This ar-
ticle exempliﬁes this strategy. First, I submit that ICA is consistent with the
key empirical evidence that motivates AA. Indeed, ICA ﬁts that evidence
even better than AA. Second, I argue that ICA can accommodate the theo-
retical considerations that motivate AA. Third, I contend that ICA has two
explanatory advantages over AA.2
Although the main focus will be on the philosophy of cognitive science,
the discussion will enable us to draw lessons of broader signiﬁcance to phi-
losophy. These lessons touch on relational theories of perceptual experience,
the characterization of the structure of perceptual content, and the project of
naturalizing intentionality.3
The article proceeds as follows. After introducing some conceptual dis-
tinctions (sec. 1), I present the two leading accounts of visual reference in
recent cognitive science: RA and AA (sec. 2). Next, I sketch ICA (sec. 3).
I defend ICA in the remainder of the article (secs. 4–7).
1. Conceptual Distinctions. A number of researchers have introduced the
concept of a mental ﬁle to frame their theories of object cognition and refer-1. I provide a precise characterization of these views in sec. 2.
2. Carey (2009, 68, 135ff.) has also formulated the conjecture that object representations
have iconic content. Nevertheless, she has not motivated this view in her analysis of vi-
sual reference.
3. Echeverri (2016a, 2016b) explores other philosophical ramiﬁcations of the current
approach.
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VISUAL REFERENCE AND ICONIC CONTENT 763ence (Kahneman, Treisman, and Gibbs 1992; Dickie 2010; Recanati 2012).
A mental ﬁle is a mental representation that enables a system to store infor-
mation about individuals. I will adopt this framework here.
I am interested in the ability to visually refer to objects like trees, tables,
and rocks. Most cognitive scientists hold that visual reference is underwrit-
ten by two largely different abilities: segmentation and recognition (Kahne-
man et al. 1992, 176–77). Segmentation is the ability to ‘detach’ various el-
ements from the scene as one object. This ability differs from recognition
because one can segment unfamiliar objects. Think of an astronaut exploring
the surface of an unknown planet. Although she might be unable to recog-
nize any object, she could certainly segment some objects from the rest of
the scene. I will focus here on the ability to segment visually.
We can also use the segmentation/recognition contrast to distinguish two
kinds of mental ﬁles: object ﬁles and recognitional ﬁles (Kahneman et al.
1992, 176–77). Suppose that our astronaut found a very strange object. When
this occurred, an object ﬁle was activated in working memory to represent
the strange object. If she managed to recognize that object, a recognitional
ﬁle containing long-termmemories would become active. This ﬁle might in-
clude information about that speciﬁc object or about the sort of object it is.
Since I am interested only in the mechanisms that underlie the activation and
maintenance of object ﬁles, I remain neutral on the nature of recognitional
ﬁles.
It would take us too far aﬁeld to provide an analysis of the concept of an
object. To circumvent this problem, I follow the standard practice of charac-
terizing objects by means of examples. Paradigmatic objects include trees,
tables, and rocks. Many cognitive scientists think that our ability to segment
objects is partly determined by a number of principles (Spelke 1994; Carey
2009). I call these principles ‘object constraints’ because they impose con-
ditions that some aggregates of elements must satisfy in order to be parsed as
objects. Here are three constraints:All Continuity: Humans (and other animals) attend to and keep track of enti-
ties that seem to follow a continuous path through space and time.
Cohesion: Humans (and other animals) understand objects as entities that
keep their parts bound together, forming an internally uniﬁed whole.
Permanence: Humans (and other animals) understand objects as entities
that continue to exist even if they are out of sight. (Spelke 1994; Carey
2009)Although objects such as trees, tables, and rocks respect these constraints,
satisfying them is insufﬁcient for an entity to count as a material object. Af-
ter all, entities we do not usually count as material objects—such as circlesThis content downloaded from 128.006.218.072 on September 13, 2017 19:47:12 PM
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All uon screens—may behave in ways that respect these conditions. Let us intro-
duce the expression ‘visual object’ to denote aggregates of entities that sat-
isfy the object constraints but are not paradigmatic material objects. A circle
on a screen is different from paradigmatic material objects because it is not
three-dimensional and has a very ephemeral existence. Still, a circle on a
screen can respect some object constraints in specially contrived experimen-
tal setups (Pylyshyn 2003, 2007; Matthen 2005; Scholl 2007). Thus, a circle
on a screen can lead to the formation of an object ﬁle. Hereafter, when I
speak of ‘objects’, I mean either material or visual objects.
I remain neutral on the relations between material and visual objects.
Nevertheless, I impose a condition on the referents of object ﬁles: they are
mind-independent entities. There are three main motivations for this condi-
tion. First, if object ﬁles can misrepresent their objects, the latter should be
characterized independently of our visual or cognitive abilities. Thus, this
assumption is essential to any representational account of visual reference.
Second, this approach ﬁts pretty well with the widespread belief that our
abilities to segment and track objects have increased the ﬁtness and repro-
ductive success of our ancestors (Millikan 2000; Pylyshyn 2003, 2007; Carey
2009). Intuitively, it is the mind-independent moving target that is tracked by
the lion and serves it as a basis for inductive learning. Third, the design of the
experiments requires a characterization of the targets of object ﬁles that is
independent of subjects’ speciﬁc cognitive and perceptual abilities. If this
characterization were not available, it would be impossible to determine
whether they successfully completed the task.4
2. Two Accounts. A number of developmental psychologists have charac-
terized object perception as underwritten by representational systems (Spelke
1988, 1994; Carey 2009). There are at least two ways of ﬂeshing out this
claim. First, one might hold that visual reference involves the operation of ob-
ject representations such as object ﬁles (sec. 1). Indeed, Carey (2009) and her
colleagues (Carey and Xu 2001) have made a strong case for the claim that
object ﬁles serve as input for physical reasoning, enter into number-relevant
computations, and support intentional action. There is, however, a more con-
troversial way of ﬂeshing out this approach:4. I c
se subRepresentational Account (RA): The mechanisms that underlie the activa-
tion and maintenance of object ﬁles have representational content.This view is explicit in Carey’s (2009, 68, 135ff.) conjecture that object rep-
resentations have iconic content. It is also implicit in Spelke’s (1988) conjec-
ture that object cognition is underwritten by a conceptual system.ome back to this point in sec. 4.
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VISUAL REFERENCE AND ICONIC CONTENT 765Pylyshyn (2001, 2003, 2007) has rejected RA. Although he has used the
mental-ﬁle framework in order to explain visual reference, he also thinks
that the mechanisms that activate and maintain object ﬁles refer in a causal,
nonrepresentational manner: “This sort of causal connection between a per-
ceptual system and an object in a scene is quite different from a representa-
tional or intentional or conceptual connection. For one thing there can be no
question of the object being misrepresented since it is not represented as
something” (Pylyshyn 2001, 147; see also his 2003, 219 n. 7; 2007, 49).
Contrary to developmental psychologists, Pylyshyn thinks that the mech-
anisms underlying the activation and maintenance of object ﬁles are directly
implemented in the functional architecture (AA). He defends this approach
by denying RA:All Nonrepresentational Account: The mechanisms that underlie the activa-
tion and maintenance of object ﬁles lack representational content.Pylyshyn’s reasoning requires some unpacking. In computer science, the
concept of a functional architecture characterizes the elementary computa-
tional resources that are necessary to realize cognitive processes (Pylyshyn
1984, 30, 154, 161; 2001, 148). Thus, if one holds that segmentation and
tracking are part of the functional architecture, one is claiming that segmen-
tation and tracking are elementary computational resources (Pylyshyn 2003,
258; 2007, 39).
Pylyshyn (1984) is committed to a semantic view of computation. He
thinks that computations are deﬁned over mental representations (see Pic-
cinini [2015] for an overview). Thus, if an operation is directly instantiated
in the functional architecture, it is not computational, at least on a semantic
understanding of computation. It is “simply performed, or ‘instantiated’, by
properties of the biological substrate in a manner not requiring the postula-
tion of internal representations. To ask how a primitive function is carried
out is to ask for a functional or perhaps a physical (or biological) descrip-
tion” (Pylyshyn 1984, 154; see also xvii, 30–31, 132–33).
Suppose one holds—as Pylyshyn does—that the aim of cognitive science
is to explain complex abilities by formulating algorithms that operate over
mental representations. On this view, any phenomenon that cannot be ex-
plained via an algorithm that operates over mental representations will auto-
matically fall outside the purview of cognitive science. This is certainly a
controversial view. Still, it reveals what is at stake in his debate with devel-
opmental psychologists. If being representational is sufﬁcient to fall within
the purview of cognitive science, developmental psychologists have been
trying to elucidate visual reference within cognitive science. Pylyshyn in-
sists, by contrast, that it is not the business of cognitive science to explain vi-
sual reference.This content downloaded from 128.006.218.072 on September 13, 2017 19:47:12 PM
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All uPylyshyn’s defense of AA is based on an inference to the best explana-
tion. He thinks that AA best explains the available empirical evidence and
some theoretical requirements on the mechanisms that activate and maintain
object ﬁles. I will dispute these claims. Indeed, there is at least one version of
RA that is consistent with the empirical evidence, can respond to Pylyshyn’s
theoretical considerations, and has some explanatory advantages over AA.
Before I present these arguments, I have to introduce the version of RA I rec-
ommend.
3. The Iconic-Content Account. Pylyshyn’s central claim is that the ref-
erence of object ﬁles “is quite different from a representational or intentional
or conceptual connection.” The version of RA I recommend holds that the
connection of object ﬁles with objects is representational albeit not concep-
tual. What does it mean to hold that visual reference is representational?
Let us distinguish a representation from its representational content. The
string ‘Pierre can ﬂy’—phonologically or morphologically individuated—is
a representation. By analogy, its psychological counterpart PIERRE CAN FLY is
amental representation. Let us say that a mental representation carries a rep-
resentational content. A representational content is an abstract entity. Typi-
cal examples of contents are propositions and their constituents. We will say
that representational contents determine correctness conditions. The latter
are situations under which a representational content is correct or incorrect.
The proposition hPierre, hcan ﬂyii is correct if and only if Pierre can ﬂy. It is
incorrect otherwise. Let us use the adjective ‘correct’ as a generic term cov-
ering a variety of evaluations like truth or accuracy. The claim that Pylyshyn
rejects but I defend is that abstract entities that determine correctness condi-
tions mediate the reference of object ﬁles.
To be sure, Pylyshyn does admit that object ﬁles can be constituents of
complex representations that carry representational contents. He dubs the
mechanisms that ﬁx the reference of object ﬁles ‘FINSTs’. These devices work
in a similar way to linguistic demonstratives, for they can refer to different
objects in different perceptual contexts (Pylyshyn 2007, 16 n. 5). Thus, when
the visual system encodes the property blue, Pylyshynwill interpret this as the
tokening of the representation THAT IS BLUE, a representation that can be as-
sessed as correct or incorrect. What Pylyshyn denies but I accept is that the
object ﬁle itself—before any perceptual attribution to an object—has repre-
sentational content and that this content mediates its reference.
This proposal may seem counterintuitive. If we follow the linguistic anal-
ogy too closely, tokens of ‘that’ cannot have representational content unless
they are paired with a predicate, for only their relation to a predicate will en-
able them to represent its referent as something (Pylyshyn 2003, 219 n. 7).
Nevertheless, my suggestion will gain plausibility if we think of object ﬁles
as icons that carry iconic content. A picture can accurately represent yourThis content downloaded from 128.006.218.072 on September 13, 2017 19:47:12 PM
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VISUAL REFERENCE AND ICONIC CONTENT 767father even though it lacks predicative structure. Thus, object ﬁles can be
correct or incorrect in the same way in which pictures can be correct or in-
correct. According to Fodor (2008, 173), a content is iconic if and only if it
satisﬁes the Parts Principle: if P is a picture of X, then parts of P are pictures
of parts of X. The idea is that object ﬁles are icons analogous to pictures and
different from words. A picture of a dog represents not only the dog but also
its ears, its eyes, its nose, and other dog parts. In contrast, the word ‘dog’
does not represent any part of the dog (Carey 2009, 135). This is the core
idea of ICA: object ﬁles are icons that represent objects and their parts
(97ff.).5
ICA has a straightforward consequence for the project of explaining vi-
sual reference. Instead of asking questions concerning the ‘activation’ of
the quasi-linguistic symbol THAT, we should rather spell out the conditions
under which the visual system builds up icons for objects. Of course, this
is not to deny that object ﬁles may be similar to demonstratives in some re-
spects. The point is that the linguistic analogymasks the representational com-
plexity of object ﬁles.
We can now distinguish AA from ICA. AA holds that visual reference is
achieved via a semantically primitive demonstrative that directly picks out
objects. ICA grants that we may need to posit semantically primitive repre-
sentations. Still, these semantically primitive representations refer not to ob-
jects but to the pre-objective elements used by the visual system as input to
build up object ﬁles. By a ‘pre-objective element’ I mean any property in-
stance that can be used as input to build up object representations. They will
include slant, vertical, and horizontal bars, vertexes, T-junctions, chromatic
properties, and so on. Hereafter, I use ‘thin index’ to denote any device that
refers to a pre-objective element.
Thin indexes, however numerous, are not sufﬁcient to produce a repre-
sentation of an object. They would be sufﬁcient only if objects were bare
collections of elements. Objects are not bare collections of elements but
highly structured entities. That is why one and the same collection of ele-
ments can form different objects. For this reason, if the visual system can
form icons for objects, it will need some combinatorial principles that con-
fer structure on active thin indexes. These principles will enable the visual
system to distinguish different objects formed by the same collections of
elements. ICA hypothesizes that so-called object constraints are combina-
torial principles that govern the formation and maintenance of object ﬁles.5. We should be careful to distinguish Fodor’s Parts Principle from another, false prin-
ciple: if E1, E2, . . ., En21, En are parts of X, and a system has a picture P of X, then there
are parts of P that stand for E1, E2, . . ., En21, En. This principle precludes the possibility
of having sparse iconic representations, i.e., iconic representations that represent some
but not all of the proper parts of an object. See Matthen (2014, 277).
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All uICA says that the mechanisms of object segmentation and tracking manip-
ulate thin indexes in conformity with object constraints.6
We have now the materials to characterize the correctness conditions of
object ﬁles. Object ﬁles are governed by a ‘matching condition’.6. Ob
as tho
some
(2016
7. I c
se subMatching Condition: If a sequence of active thin indexes I1, I2, . . . , In21, In
are combined in conformity with an object constraint, C, then there is one
combination of pre-objective elements E1, E2, . . . , En21, En that stand in an
appropriate causal relation to I1, I2, . . . , In21, In and exemplify the object
constraint C.It has been observed that perceptual content has accuracy conditions be-
cause it can be correct to some degree (Burge 2010). We could therefore re-
ﬁne the matching condition in order to make room for partially accurate
iconic contents. One might count the visual system as successfully segment-
ing an object even though not all the thin indexes over which object con-
straints operate select elements belonging to one and the same object. Think
of the visual segmentation of objects in cluttered scenes. If objects are in
contact with each other, the visual system may be led to form one icon that
includes some proper parts of numerically different neighboring objects. Still,
within some limits, this might not impair successful segmentation. The de-
grees of inaccuracy that are still compatible with successful segmentation
may depend on the task at hand and the perceptual context. Their determina-
tion is an empirical matter.7
Recall now Pylyshyn’s contention that the “causal connection between a
perceptual system and an object in a scene is quite different from a represen-
tational or intentional . . . connection.” ICA rejects this claim because it can
deﬁne an iconic content for object ﬁles. Consider the following extensional
characterization. The iconic content of an object ﬁle FOxF is a function f(FE1,
E2, . . . , En21, EnF) of a sequence FE1, E2, . . . , En21, EnF of pre-objective el-
ements. When the argument of the function is given, the icon Ox is formed.
Yet, the formation of Ox is not sufﬁcient for successful reference. An active
icon Ox successfully refers to an object in the world only if there is one se-
quence FE1, E2, . . . , En21, EnF of pre-objective elements E1, E2, . . . , En21, En
in the world that matches and stands in an appropriate causal relation to the
represented sequence. (Of course, we could reﬁne this characterization in or-ject constraints should be supplemented with other organizational principles, such
se governing the ﬁgure-ground distinction. These principles enable us to perceive
surfaces in depth, so they are necessary to perceive material objects. See Echeverri
b).
ome back to this point in sec. 4.
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VISUAL REFERENCE AND ICONIC CONTENT 769der to make room for cases of partial matching that are still compatible with
successful reference).8
Pylyshyn accepts that an object ﬁle can carry representational content, pro-
vided that it is attached to a predicate. The representation THAT IS BLUE can be
correct or incorrect. Yet, Pylyshyn denies that a bare occurrence of THAT can
have representational content. ICA resists this conclusion. Indeed, it recognizes
a whole class of ‘pre-attributional’ perceptual errors. Consider an example.8. Th
tent v
elem
perce
9. Pr
Neve
tiona
and s
you s
case,
also
The
same
nosia
tients
Ridd
All Binding proper parts of numerically different objects into one object. Imag-
ine that you take two lemons of exactly the same size, texture, and color. You
cut each lemon into two halves. Next, you put one-half of lemon 1 with an-
other half of lemon 2 so that the ﬂesh of the former makes contact with the
ﬂesh of the latter. Youmight then put the two halves on a table and eventually
‘fool’ someone into seeing the two halves as one object. This case would
count as amisrepresentation. After all, the two halves are not disposed to form
an internally uniﬁed whole, contradicting the principle of cohesion (sec. 1).ICA provides an elegant characterization of this case. Although the per-
ceptual episode may involve the misattribution of some properties to the
whole of two lemon halves, there is a kind of error that does not consist in
the misattribution of properties to that entity. After all, in order to misattrib-
ute any property to any object, one has ﬁrst to successfully segment it. Thus,
the previous case illustrates the idea that object ﬁles, understood as icons,
can misrepresent objects prior to any attribution of properties to objects. If
one follows Pylyshyn’s lead, however, one will be compelled to treat all seg-
mentation mistakes—if there are any—as attribution mistakes. Although I
see this as a disadvantage of Pylyshyn’s view, it will require some work to
show why it is. I do that in the reminder of the article.9is extensional speciﬁcation is not mandatory. We might also specify the iconic con-
ia nonextensional entities analogous to Fregean senses that stand for pre-objective
ents. This maneuver would enable us to assign a common content to perception and
ptual imagination.
eattributional mistakes are more pervasive than the lemon example might suggest.
rtheless, their existence may be masked because they tend to co-occur with attribu-
l errors downstream of visual segmentation. Suppose that you are walking in a park
eem to see a small dog snifﬁng something under a distant bush. On closer approach
ee that it was just part of a paper bag, some branches, and a play of shadow. In this
a preattributional mistake led you to misrecognize a portion of reality as a dog. It is
plausible to hold that impossible ﬁgures are preceded by segmentation mistakes.
reason why the visual system ends up attributing incompatible properties to the
thing is that it made a segmentation mistake. The empirical literature on visual ag-
might also provide indirect evidence of preattributional perceptual errors, for pa-
suffering this deﬁcit have impaired segmentation abilities (see Humphreys and
och 2014). I am indebted here to a referee for this journal.
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All u4. Empirical Evidence. My ﬁrst argument is that ICA successfully ac-
counts for the empirical evidence that originally motivated AA. Indeed, it
offers a superior account to the one provided by AA.
Pylyshyn and his coworkers created an experimental paradigm in order to
test AA:multiple-object tracking (MOT). In a typicalMOTexperiment, sub-
jects are presented with various qualitatively identical items on a computer
screen. Some of them are ﬂashed to indicate their status as targets. After that,
the objects start moving randomly for some time (usually 10 seconds). At the
end, observers are asked to indicate the original targets. These studies sug-
gest that humans can keep track of four or ﬁve moving targets in parallel.
Some variations of this paradigm also suggest that observers can track indi-
viduals even though they change some of their properties, like shape and color.
Strikingly, subjects are often unaware of changes in objects’ properties dur-
ing tracking. As Pylyshyn puts it: “It appears that nothing is stored in the ob-
ject ﬁles under typical MOT conditions, which suggests that targets are not
being picked out under a description—they are not picked out as things that
have certain properties or satisfy certain predicates” (2007, 40; see also 21, 34
52, 68).
In order to track an object, the visual system traces its numerical identity
“back to a prior state when it was known to be a target” (Pylyshyn 2007, 45).
Hence, visual tracking is governed by a principle of continuity. For our cur-
rent purposes, the most striking aspect of Pylyshyn’s ﬁndings is that repre-
sentations of the shapes and colors of objects do not seem to play any role in
the maintenance of object ﬁles.10
Pylyshyn appeals to work in the philosophy of language to interpret these
results. Philosophers have explored two broadly different accounts of how
singular expressions refer. According to descriptivism, reference is ﬁxed
by an object’s satisfaction of properties. According to referentialism, refer-
ence is ﬁxed by causal relations to objects (see Recanati [2012] for discus-
sion). Given that representations of the color and shape of objects do not
seem to play a role in tracking, Pylyshyn (2007, 17–19, 68) concludes that
a descriptivist account of visual tracking is not an option. Assuming that
descriptivism and referentialism exhaust the theoretical options, he is led
to hypothesize that the latter offers the best framework to account for these
empirical ﬁndings. On this view, the reference of object ﬁles is maintained
by a causal, nonrepresentational mechanism.
Pylyshyn’s contention that representations of the properties of objects
play no role in successful tracking is also based on the idea that targets and
nontargets are qualitatively indistinguishable from each other. Onemight think
that this offers an argument to reject ICA, for the latter predicts that the en-10. I qualify this interpretation below. Pylyshyn also insists that representations of loca-
tions and sortals play no role in visual tracking. I will not discuss these claims here.
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VISUAL REFERENCE AND ICONIC CONTENT 771coding of some property instances is necessary for successful tracking. After
all, if object constraints are combinatorial principles, they need active thin in-
dexes as inputs. And these thin indexes refer to property instances.
This conclusion is, however, mistaken. If targets lacked some detectable
properties, they would blend into the background; they would not be salient
as targets. Therefore, even if properties are not necessary to distinguish each
target from other targets and nontargets, they are still necessary to distin-
guish each target from the background. ICA accommodates this insight by
saying that thin indexes that refer to property instances must remain active
during visual tracking. Yet, it is irrelevant to successful tracking whether this
thin index or that thin index becomes active. All the visual system needs is
that some thin indexes detect some property instances. Successful tracking
depends on whether these thin-indexed pre-objective elements display the
right patterns of behavior over time (i.e., the sorts of behavior described by
object constraints).
Consider an analogy. Suppose that you are watching a group of people
jogging very far away on a ﬁeld. In order to keep track of the group, each
member should have at least some detectable chromatic properties that dis-
tinguish it from the ﬁeld. Yet, your ability to keep track of the group does not
require the additional ability to keep track of the chromatic properties of each
jogger. Given the distance, youmay be unable to determine whether member 1
has the same chromatic properties as member 2 or whether member 1 changed
her chromatic properties from t1 to t2. Still, this will not prevent you from suc-
cessfully tracking the group. All you need is that each jogger has at least some
property instance that your visual system can detect, enabling you to distin-
guish it from the ﬁeld.What enables you to keep track of the group is your abil-
ity to detect a sustained pattern of behavior deﬁned over chromatically discrim-
inable members of the group, independently of which chromatic properties are
enabling you to make the target/background differentiation. The proposal is
that object ﬁles work in a similar way. They are icons that collect pre-objective
elements that satisfy some constraints. Because these collections satisfy object
constraints, they differ from groups of people, which display a lower degree of
cohesiveness and continuity over time.
Why do subjects fail to notice some changes of properties? According to
an inﬂuential view, workingmemory is necessary for access (Prinz 2012). Re-
call now that object ﬁles are standardly construed as representations in work-
ing memory (sec. 1). Thus, one might submit that the property instances used
as input to build up object ﬁles are not encoded in working memory. In Pyly-
shyn’s framework, in order for a property F to be encoded in working mem-
ory, the tokening of a representation of the form THAT IS F is necessary. Inter-
estingly, ICA offers a representational structure that precedes the formation of
these predicative representations. Property instances only ﬁgure as proper
parts of represented objects, not as the semantic values of predicates of objectThis content downloaded from 128.006.218.072 on September 13, 2017 19:47:12 PM
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All uﬁles. Therefore, ICA can explain why subjects fail to report some changes of
properties.
Interestingly, Pylyshyn is aware that some results of MOTexperiments run
against his indexing theory. I want to suggest now that ICA is better placed
than AA to explain these results.
It has been observed that increasing the number of nontargets will impair
performance (Sears and Pylyshyn 2000; Pylyshyn 2004). This contradicts
the FINST theory, which says that successful tracking is solely determined
by a causal relation that holds between FINSTs and individual targets. For this
reason, Sears and Pylyshyn (2000) have modiﬁed the FINST theory accord-
ingly: increasing the nontargets in a given display will raise the probability
of mistaking a nontarget for a target. As Pylyshyn puts it: “Confusing one
individual object with another object represents a failure to correctly track
that object. . . . Switching the identity of a target with that of a nontarget does
show up as a tracking error” (2004, 816; emphasis mine).
Pylyshyn seems to be moving here toward a RA of visual tracking. Inter-
estingly, whereas ICA does predict that these tracking errors should occur,
AA does not predict their occurrence. Therefore, ICA is better placed than
AA to account for these ﬁndings.
Recall that ICA imposes a matching condition on successful visual refer-
ence: if the thin-indexed pre-objective elements do not belong to one com-
bination of elements in the world, the iconic representation will be (partially)
inaccurate (sec. 3). Thus, when the number of nontargets is increased, this
raises the probability that some of the thin indexes that are attached to a tar-
get become attached also to a nontarget. If all the thin indexes initially at-
tached to a target switch to a nontarget, the visual system will be led to mis-
represent a nontarget as numerically the same as the target or the nontarget as
a temporal continuation of the target. This is an example of preattributional
misrepresentation. One object ﬁle Ox remains active during the whole exper-
iment. Still, some of the elements E1, E2, E3 that work as inputs for that object
ﬁle belong to the target, while other elements E4, E5, E6 belong to a nontarget.
Assuming that all these elements are linked to each other by the principle of
continuity, this is a case of misrepresentation. The visual system is led to
‘merge’ into one sequence what are in fact two different sequences. It merged
parts of the ‘target worm’ and parts of the ‘nontarget worm’ into a single spa-
tiotemporal worm.
Some might wonder whether Pylyshyn could not account for these re-
sults without introducing object-ﬁle misrepresentation.11 I am skeptic about
the prospects of this view.11. I am indebted here to Mohan Matthen. As far as I can see, this constitutes the most
natural line of reply available to Pylyshyn. There could be other replies, though. I leave
them as an exercise for the reader.
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VISUAL REFERENCE AND ICONIC CONTENT 773Pylyshyn should grant that the task at hand sets some correctness condi-
tions. The MOT task is successfully performed just in case the items that
were indicated as targets at the beginning of the experiment match the items
that subjects indicate as targets at the end of the experiment. Thus, even de-
fenders of AA should grant that tracking is evaluable as correct or incorrect.
Still, they could try to dissociate the assessment of the task as correctly or
incorrectly performed from the introduction of incorrect mental representa-
tions.
In my view, this move would yield a complicated and ad hoc account.
First, Pylyshyn would have to grant that the indexes that were causally co-
varying with a target started to covary with a nontarget. Second, Pylyshyn
would have to explain why this covariation shift occurred. One optionwould
be to offer no account of the conditions under which targets coming close to
nontargets swap indexes. This would represent a disadvantage of AA over
ICA. After all, ICA says that those switches arise when elements of targets
and nontargets satisfy—for a short time at least—some object constraints. In
the current case, pre-objective elements belonging to different objects are
seen as a continuous spatiotemporal worm. Another option would be to clas-
sify these cases into two groups: those in which a target coming close to a
nontarget leads to a swap of indexes and those in which a target coming close
to a nontarget does not lead to a swap of indexes. In this case, we would like
to know what principles enable defenders of AA to distinguish these two
kinds of cases. If the principles are nothing but object constraints, Pyly-
shyn’s account is a notational variant of ICA. If they are not object con-
straints, the resulting account is more complicated than ICA. AA is led to
posit—in an ad hoc manner—object constraints to account for successful
tracking and other principles to account for target/nontarget switches.
5. The Regress Argument. My second argument is that ICA can respond
to the regress argument, the key theoretical consideration in favor of AA.
Pylyshyn (2003, 245) criticizes what he terms the ‘pure description’ theory
of reference. His critique consists of two claims:
1. Pure description theories of reference lead to a regress.
2. The best way of blocking the regress is to hold that the visual system
can select objects in a purely causal manner.
According to Pylyshyn’s (2003, 205, 245; 2007, 12ff.) characterization, pure
descriptivism explains visual reference by positing a set of predicates that
represent properties. Let us suppose that an object ﬁle is associated with
some predicates F1(x), F2(x), . . . , Fn21(x), Fn(x). The relevant object ﬁle re-
fers to whatever entity satisﬁes F1(x), F2(x), . . . , Fn21(x), Fn(x), most of them,
or a weighted sum of them. As Pylyshyn points out, this view leads to a re-This content downloaded from 128.006.218.072 on September 13, 2017 19:47:12 PM
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All ugress. Suppose we try to explain how the predicate Fi(x) is anchored to an
object o. In order to yield a representation of the formFi(o), the process could
not rely on a further predicateFi11(x). After all, if the selection of an object re-
quired a prior application of the predicate Fi11(x), we would get Fi(Fi11(x)).
If the only way of referring to an object were to encode a property, we would
be launched in a regress. Since there is no such regress—because the visual
system does refer to objects—pure description theories are false. There must
be nondescriptive modes of reference.
What is the nature of these nondescriptive modes of reference? As indi-
cated in section 4, Pylyshyn appeals to work in the philosophy of language in
order to develop his own views. Following the lead of philosophers of lan-
guage, Pylyshyn concludes that nondescriptive modes of reference should
be modeled along referentialist lines (i.e., as causal relations to objects).
Pylyshyn’s suggestion is that there is a causal relation that ﬁxes the reference
of object ﬁles before any representation of properties. Standing in a causal
relation to an object is a precondition for representing the properties of that
object (Pylyshyn 2003, 2007; see also Leslie et al. 1998; Campbell 2012;
Recanati 2012).
But why should we think of that mechanism as a causal relation to objects?
Pylyshyn motivates this view with a different regress argument: “Sooner or
later concepts must be grounded in a primitive causal connection between
thoughts and things. The project of grounding concepts . . . in perception re-
mains an essential requirement if we are to avoid an inﬁnite regress” (2001,
154; see also his 2007, 17, 33, 57).
Pylyshyn supports his referentialist view by combining two different re-
gress arguments. The ﬁrst one establishes the existence of nondescriptive
modes of reference to objects. The second one establishes that there cannot
be mental representations all the way down; any account of reference has to
introduce primitive causal connections with items in the world. Thus, in
Pylyshyn’s framework, primitive causal connections are introduced at the
level of nondescriptive modes of reference to objects.
ICA resists this identiﬁcation of the regress arguments. Although it grants
that any theory of mental representation must be grounded in primitive causal
connections with items in the world, it denies that those primitive causal con-
nections ought to hold between thoughts and things or, more precisely, be-
tween objectﬁles and objects. Indeed, if those connections hold between some
thin indexes and pre-objective elements in the world, one can hold that non-
descriptive modes of reference have representational content without being
prey to the second regress argument.1212. The qualiﬁcation ‘some thin indexes’ is important because the visual system may con-
fer a rudimentary structure to representations of clusters of features. Rensnik’s (2000) hy-
pothesis of ‘proto-objects’—volatile clusters of features that fade away within some milli-
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VISUAL REFERENCE AND ICONIC CONTENT 775The preceding discussion has wider implications. Philosophers of percep-
tion have used regress arguments structurally analogous to the ones exam-
ined here in order to defend the claim that nonrepresentational relations to
objects play a fundamental role in the analysis of the structure of perceptual
experiences (e.g., Campbell 2009). If we make room for the existence of
iconic representational contents, we can see that there is a non sequitur in
these arguments.
6. The Grounding Problem. Pylyshyn also thinks that it is unclear how
RA could ground object representations. My third argument is that ICA
can offer a plausible account of how object representations are grounded.
Commenting on RA, Pylyshyn writes:secon
Since
All The question of whether infants have the concept of object . . . does even-
tually run into the need to ground that concept in experience (by ‘ground’ I
mean connect the concept with its instances, not learn or acquire the con-
cept, whichmaywell be innate). For example, it has been suggested that the
ﬁrst sortal concept that an infant has is the concept object . . . , which is the
concept of something that is ‘bounded, coherent, three-dimensional, and
moves as a whole’ . . . . But of course if that’s what an object is for an in-
fant, then infants must also have the concepts ‘bounded’, ‘coherent’, ‘three-
dimensional’, and ‘moves as awhole’, in which case the Spelke object could
not be their ﬁrst concept. (Pylyshyn 2007, 51)In order to interpret this paragraph, we need a distinction between two kinds
of projects: the naturalization project and the grounding project. The natural-
ization project seeks to identify a set of naturalistic conditions that are suf-
ﬁcient for something to count as a representation. These conditions may in-
voke the concepts of information and biological function. The grounding
project seeks to identify the general structure of the mechanisms that con-
nect mental representations with their referents. Pylyshyn’s remarks belong
to this second project. His worry is that, if we construe object ﬁles as com-
plex representations involving representations of the properties bounded,
coherent, moves as a whole, and so on, it will be a mystery how these rep-
resentations are connected with their referents. This feeling of mystery is
exacerbated by the ﬁrst regress argument against pure description theories
(sec. 5). And, even if we set aside these views, it remains unclear how such
general representations can be connected with all and only things that satisfy
object constraints. If we wanted to design a mechanism that would perform
this task, we would be at a loss.ds or are overwritten by subsequent stimuli—constitutes an example of this idea.
they are not objects in the sense of sec. 1, they would count as pre-objective.
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All uPylyshyn’s worry will have a hold on us only if we construe the properties
of being bounded, coherent, or moves as a whole as represented by predi-
cates of object ﬁles. But this assumption is not mandatory. Suppose that ob-
ject ﬁles are icons. Although icons have a complex representational structure,
they lack the quasi-linguistic predicative structure that is taken for granted in
Pylyshyn’s objection. Thus, one might hold that object ﬁles are aggregates
of thin indexes organized in conformity with object constraints. Thus, the
problem of how very general representations of object constraints are con-
nected with their bearer does not arise.
In order to see why the problem does not arise, we have to improve our
understanding of the available theoretical options. Let us stipulate that a
property F is explicitly represented by a system, S, just in case S has a phys-
ical structure that stands for F and this physical structure can be used as input
for other operations. Thus, some neurons explicitly represent features be-
cause they have the function of covarying with those features and can be
used as input for other operations. Let us stipulate that a propertyG is implic-
itly represented by a system, S, just in caseG characterizes some mental op-
erations performed over explicit representations. Hence, a system that forms
an object ﬁle in response to a sequence FE1, E2, . . ., En21, EnF is a system that
explicitly represents E1, E2, . . ., En21, En and implicitly represents the object
constraints, for the latter characterize the way it combines those elements.
Therefore, it is true that the satisfaction of object constraints is necessary
for the formation and maintenance of object ﬁles. Nevertheless, this satis-
factional relation is not psychologically implemented as a relation between
an object ﬁle and a set of predicates. It is rather implemented in the disposi-
tions of the visual system to combine pre-objective elements in some speciﬁc
ways.
The resulting view preserves part of the spirit of AA. There are indexes
that refer in a purely causal manner. Yet, contra Pylyshyn, those indexes di-
rectly refer not to objects but to pre-objective elements. In addition, there are
operations that govern visual segmentation and tracking. Nevertheless, while
Pylyshyn treats visual segmentation and tracking as basic operations of the
functional architecture, ICA factorizes object segmentation and tracking as
the interplay of mechanisms that refer to pre-objective elements plus a battery
of object constraints that govern the dispositions of the system to combine thin
indexes in some ways.
We are now in a position to see how ICA can provide a solution to the
grounding problem. When we explain a piece of behavior by means of dis-
positions, we are committed to providing a noncircular account of their trig-
gering conditions. If we said, “the dispositions to form an object ﬁle are trig-
gered by the detection of an object,” our account would be circular. Thus, all
we need is a noncircular account of the triggering conditions of the disposi-
tions that govern the formation andmaintenance of object ﬁles. This accountThis content downloaded from 128.006.218.072 on September 13, 2017 19:47:12 PM
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VISUAL REFERENCE AND ICONIC CONTENT 777can be provided. If an aggregate of elements is an object, it is likely that it
instantiates a number of local conﬁgurations that are not typically instanti-
ated by nonobjects. Therefore, ICA can solve the grounding problem by pos-
iting dispositions to combine thin indexes and hypothesizing that these dis-
positions are triggered by local conﬁgurations detectable by the visual
system.
The edges formed by objects when they are momentarily occluded pro-
vide a telling example of such local conﬁgurations. In some experiments, ob-
servers are asked to keep track of objects in spaces ﬁlled with virtual
occluders (Scholl and Pylyshyn 1999). These experiments are based on
the plausible idea that objects do not pop into or out of existence, although
they do frequently pop into and out of sight. Two scenarios have been tested.
In some cases, the targets disappear by gradually ‘imploding’ and later ‘ex-
ploding’. In others, they disappear in a way that indicates the presence of oc-
cluding surfaces, by accreting and deleting along a ﬁxed contour. It has been
found that tracking abilities are not impaired in the latter case.
We can generalize from these ﬁndings as follows. The edges formed by a
momentarily occluded object are some of the triggering conditions of the
dispositions that govern object tracking. Being sensitive to these edges is
not equivalent to being sensitive to objects. Hence, if tracking is governed
by dispositions that are triggered by the edges formed by momentarily oc-
cluded objects, the current account is not circular. The idea is that the visual
system is sensitive to this and other local conﬁgurations that trigger object
representations. Other plausible examples can be found in work on percep-
tual organization (e.g., Hoffman 1998).
The previous discussion has some implications for recent debates on per-
ceptual content. According to Burge (2009, 2010), perceptual content has a
structure analogous to a noun phrase of the form ‘that F’: ‘that’ signals the
fact that successful perception requires a causal relation to an entity, and ‘F’
denotes an attribute whose representation guides reference to that entity.
Thus, Burge (2010, 456 n. 39) interprets the empirical ﬁndings on object per-
ception as evidence for the claim that visual reference is achieved via a com-
plex demonstrative in which BOUNDED, COHERENT, or CONTINUOUS ﬁgure as at-
tributive representations that guide the reference of THAT. Unfortunately,
Burge’s view seems to generate the same worries raised by Pylyshyn in
his discussion of RA. How are these attributive representations connected
with objects?
As far as I can see, Burge’s analysis cannot jointly satisfy two plausible
conditions: (1) accommodate the intuition that any constituent of a complex
representation, R, should make a nonredundant contribution to the content
of R and (2) explain why the associated attributives in the object represen-
tation apply to all and only things that are bounded, coherent, and so on. Burge
could try to satisfy condition 1 by characterizing THAT as a placeholder for aThis content downloaded from 128.006.218.072 on September 13, 2017 19:47:12 PM
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All ucausal relation between the visual system and any mind-independent entity in
the world. This reading is strongly suggested by the generality of Burge’s
analysis: noun phrase structures of the form THAT F are supposed to describe
the semantic structure of perceptual representations of bodies, shapes, colors,
and any other entity that can remain the same over changes in information reg-
istration. Unfortunately, this approach would prevent Burge from satisfying
condition 2. After all, the generality of this analysis makes the semantic value
of THAT too unspeciﬁc to connect these very general attributive representa-
tions to all and only things that are bounded, coherent, and so on.
Burge could try to satisfy condition 2 by holding that THAT stands for an
object. This proposal is apparent in Burge’s analysis of object segmentation
and tracking (2009, sec. 3; 2010, 151, 234). Thus, he could say that object
representations are connected to objects because THAT stands for an object.
Unfortunately, this approach would prevent him from satisfying condition 1:
accommodate the intuition that any constituent of a complex representation,
R, should make a nonredundant contribution to the content of R. After all, if
the attributives also refer to objects, what is the point of having a separate
constituent that refers to objects too?
In my view, these problems are generated by the misleading linguistic
analogy that drives Burge’s analysis. Linguistic representations have all-
purpose demonstrative representations like ‘this’ and ‘that’ that can refer to
almost anything. That is why speakers often provide guidance to their inter-
locutor by pairing these all-purpose devices with attributives; attributives fa-
cilitate the task of identifying the referent when there are many equally salient
entities to which the demonstrative could refer. As far as I know, there is no
evidence that the visual system has all-purpose demonstrative representa-
tions that can be made more speciﬁc by being paired with general attribu-
tives. There is rather evidence for the existence of neurons that covary with
speciﬁc types of properties and some object constraints that govern visual
segmentation and tracking.
It is worth noticing that the problems faced by Burge’s account do not
even arise when we set aside the linguistic analogy and think of object rep-
resentations as icons. Indeed, ICA provides a perspicuous characterization
of the respective semantic contributions of thin indexes and object con-
straints. Thin indexes refer to pre-objective elements, and object constraints
describe the dispositions of the system to combine active thin indexes in
ways that match the ways pre-objective elements are combined in the world.
Thus, ICA accommodates the intuition that any constituent of a complex
representation, R, should make a nonredundant contribution to the content
of R (condition 1). These dispositions are triggered by the detection of local
conﬁgurations that are reliably instantiated by objects. Thus, ICA explains
why object representations apply to all and only things that are bounded, co-
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VISUAL REFERENCE AND ICONIC CONTENT 7797. Explanatory Advantages. My ﬁnal argument in favor of ICA is that it
has some explanatory advantages over AA. We can appreciate these advan-
tages in light of two problems faced by AA.
Problem 1: Burge (2010, 455 n. 38) rightly points out that a causal rela-
tion to a property need not lead to the formation of an object representation.
After all, we can stand in causal relations to things other than visual objects:
an explosion, a ﬂash of light, or a pile of sand. Thus, something is clearlymiss-
ing from AA’s mechanistic account of the connection between object ﬁles
and objects. If the mechanism that connects object ﬁles with objects is as
simple as a brute causal relation, it is unclear why the resulting object ﬁle be-
comes active in response to all and only things that satisfy object constraints.
In other words, object constraints do not play any role within AA’s account of
visual reference.13
This problem does not even arise for ICA. On this view, thin indexes sin-
gle out pre-objective elements that constitute the input to build up object
ﬁles. Object ﬁles are formed when some dispositions are triggered by local
conﬁgurations of those pre-objective elements. Thus, the reason why object
ﬁles are not formed in response to paradigmatic explosions, ﬂashes of light,
or piles of sand is that the latter are aggregates of pre-objective elements that
do not exemplify the local conﬁgurations that trigger object constraints.
Problem 2: AA implies that the properties that lead to the formation of
object ﬁles correspond to “a disjunction of very many properties with noth-
ing in common other than that they attract indexes (i.e., they need not have a
deﬁnition independent of the FINST mechanism)” (Pylyshyn 2007, 90 n. 12).
Hence, the properties we need to explain the activation of object ﬁles include
‘whatever attracts our attention’. Alas, ‘whatever attracts our attention’ does
not correspond to any natural kind (96). But this is unsatisfactory from a
mechanistic perspective. If wewant to specify the inputs to amechanism that
activates object ﬁles, it would be better to have a well-deﬁned set of proper-
ties that can set that mechanism into operation.
Although the properties that cause the activation of thin indexes are dis-
junctive, they are not as disjunctive as the property denoted by ‘whatever at-
tracts our attention’. Suppose that a class of thin indexes becomes active in
response to green dots and that some T-junctions trigger the disposition to
treat that set of dots as one object. Admittedly, our color receptors ﬁre in re-
sponse to a disjunction of reﬂectance properties (Matthen 2005), and there
can be many different arrangements that count as T-junctions. Still, these
disjunctions of properties are not as heterogeneous as the disjunction of13. I do not mean to imply that object constraints cannot apply to ﬂashes of light, ex-
plosions, or piles of sand. My point is that a purely causal model of visual reference
leaves no room for the operation of object constraints. Thus, there is nothing to prevent
it from leading to the activation of object ﬁles in response to entities that do not satisfy
those constraints.
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All uproperties formed from ‘whatever attracts our attention’. This represents an
important step forward in a solution to the grounding problem.
Although the grounding problem is relatively independent from the way
philosophers have investigated the naturalization of intentionality, it does
have implications for the latter project. Suppose that we think that intention-
ality should be based on information relations between entities in the world
and a representational system. If ICA is correct, these information relations
should be introduced to explain the activation of the most basic thin indexes
(i.e., those feature detectors that refer in a purely causal manner). One could
therefore say that these thin indexes are devices that have the function of
carrying information of properties. Still, this would leave the naturalization
program seriously incomplete. If we are interested in object representations,
we ought to deliver a naturalistic account of the combinations of represented
properties that constitute object representations. As a result, we ought to ac-
count for the relevant object constraints in naturalistic terms. If these con-
straints characterize the dispositions of the system to combine basic thin
indexes in some ways, we have to provide a naturalistic account of the cat-
egorical bases of those dispositions and tell a story about the way our an-
cestors acquired these dispositions. If it turns out that we cannot provide a
nonintentional characterization of those dispositions and their acquisition,
this would constitute an important obstacle for the project of incorporating
intentionality into a naturalistic worldview.
8. Conclusion. I presented an account of visual reference that conceives of
object ﬁles as icons. This account enabled me to characterize a family of per-
ceptual errors that are different in kind from the misattribution of properties
to objects. These errors arise in segmentation and tracking. I defended this
account by showing that it offers a plausible explanation of the empirical ev-
idence that motivates the nonrepresentational account, it can respond to the
regress problem, it can offer a plausible solution to the grounding problem,
and it has two explanatory advantages over the nonrepresentational account.
I also underlined four broader philosophical issues: this debate is ultimately
a debate on the explanatory scope of cognitive science, our response to the
regress argument can be generalized to recent discussions on the relational
character of perceptual experiences, the proposed account constitutes an al-
ternative to Burge’s claim that perceptual contents are structured as complex
demonstratives, and it introduces a new research avenue in the program of
naturalizing intentionality.REFERENCES
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